The Third Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate Securities & Financial Law by Rosen, Kenneth M et al.
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 9, Number 2 2004 Article 1
The Third Annual Albert A. DeStefano
Lecture on Corporate Securities & Financial
Law
Kenneth M. Rosen moderator
William Michael Treanor welcoming remarks








Copyright c©2004 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
LECTURE
THE THIRD ANNUAL ALBERT A. DeSTEFANO
LECTURE ON CORPORATE SECURITIES &
FINANCIAL LAW
PANEL DISCUSSION: CELEBRATING THIRTY
YEARS OF MARKET REGULATION*
MODERATOR:
Kenneth M. Rosen'"
Assistant Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law
PANELISTS:
Brandon Becker
Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
Robert Colby***
Deputy Director, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission
' The panel discussion herein was held at the Fordham University School of Law on
April 2, 2003, for the third annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate Securities
& Financial Law. It has been edited with the assistance of the speakers.
"" Professor Rosen served as the first Fellow for the Fordham University School of Law
Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law during the 2002-2003 academic
year.
*'* The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), as a
matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for the private statements of its employees.
Accordingly, the views expressed herein by Mr. Colby, Ms. McGuire, and Ms.
Nazareth are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
their colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
296 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
Andrew Klein
Partner, Schiff Hardin & Waite
Richard Ketchum****
President & Deputy Chairman, The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.
Catherine McGuire
Chief Counsel and Associate Director, Division of Market
Regulation, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
Annette Nazareth
Director, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission
Lee A. Pickard
Partner, Pickard & Djinis LLP
WELCOME & INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
DEAN TREANOR:' Good evening, everyone.
I am Dean Treanor, the Dean of Fordham Law School. On behalf
of the entire Fordham Law School community, I would like to welcome
you to the Third Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture, "Celebrating
Thirty Years of Market Regulation."
I thank our distinguished panelists for graciously being with us
tonight and for sharing their expertise and insights on the various aspects
of market regulation and related issues.
I especially thank the law firm of Becker Ross Stone DeStefano &
Klein for establishing this lecture series honoring Mr. DeStefano, who is
currently Of Counsel to the firm, and for the support you have given to
our Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law and to the Law
School's overall educational mission of providing a forum on corporate
issues for our students and for members of the larger community.
-. Since the date of this lecture, Mr. Ketchum has served as General Counsel of
Global, Corporate & Investment Bank of Citicorp Inc. Recently, Mr. Ketchum has been
appointed by the New York Stock Exchange as its Chief Regulatory Officer.
1. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of the Fordham University School of
Law.
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Mr. DeStefano, in whose honor this lecture series is named, was a
member of the Fordham Law School Class of 1947, where he graduated
with honors and served as Recent Decisions and Comment Editor of the
Fordham Law Review. He also holds an undergraduate degree from the
College of the City of New York and a Master of Laws Degree in
Taxation from NYU Law School, where he was Graduate Editor of the
NYU Tax Law Review.
As with many of our most esteemed alumni, he has continued to be
a presence at the School long after graduation. From 1973 to 1983 he
taught a very popular course in corporate acquisitions as a member of
our Adjunct Faculty. We are pleased that he continues to be a presence
at the School through this outstanding lecture series.
Tonight's lecture represents one of a number of special events
presented by the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial
Law. These programs include public events; roundtable discussions
among academics, practitioners, and policymakers; and our Business
Law Practitioner Series, which has introduced our students to leaders in
the field and to cutting-edge legal issues.
The Center is aided in its mission by Fordham's specialized
business law journal, the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law, which has published the proceedings of many Center programs.
The most recent issue, which is now available, contains the proceedings
from our Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management, which took
place this past fall. Support for the Center's many initiatives is drawn
from the leadership of a distinguished Board of Advisors, as well as the
active participation of our many distinguished alumni in the business
and financial law areas.
The Center's programs enjoy the generous support of a variety of
donors, including the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Becker
Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein, the General Electric Company, and
Eugene F. Murphy. Also instrumental in the projects of the Corporate
Center is Professor Jill Fisch, who serves as its first Director. Professor
Fisch teaches in the areas of corporate and securities law, and her
scholarship includes work on corporate law, securities regulation, and
federal courts. Her writings have appeared in a variety of publications,
including the Harvard Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, and the
Cornell Law Review.
Professor Fisch, who has been a member of the Fordham Law
faculty since 1989, served as Sloan Visiting Professor of Law at
2004]
298 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
Georgetown University Law Center in 2001. A graduate of Cornell
University and Yale Law School, she has also served as a trial attorney
with the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She was
also associated with the law firm of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton,
where she practiced commercial securities litigation. She is somebody I
have known since law school, so I'll just leave it at that. I have always
been impressed by her as an extraordinary legal thinker and someone
with remarkable vision.
It is my pleasure to now turn things over to Professor Fisch.
Thanks very much.
PROFESSOR FISCH:2 Thank you, Dean.
It is a pleasure to be here and on behalf of the Fordham Law School
community to join the Dean in welcoming you to the Third Annual
Albert A. DeStefano Lecture.
I would like to express our School's deep gratitude to the firm of
Becker Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein for their generosity in
establishing this lecture series, and of course our gratitude to Albert
DeStefano both for giving them cause to do so and for being such a loyal
and active supporter of the School.
As you know, this lecture forms one of the crown jewels of
Fordham's new Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law. In
just three years, we seem to have created something of a tradition with
this lecture, in bringing in top people in the field to talk about an
important and timely event. In the past two years, we had discussions,
first, on SEC Regulation F-D, and then last year on the collapse of
Enron.
Tonight, as we continue to struggle with the fallout from various
corporate governance scandals, including most recently HealthSouth, the
topic of market regulation is critically important. Tonight's panelists
bring you a wealth of experience and expertise in the field of market
regulation. They range from, at the far end of this crowded table, Lee
Pickard, who was the Division Director thirty years ago, to Annette
Nazareth, at this end, the Division's current Director. Collectively, they
offer an unparalleled opportunity to understand the challenges faced by
the Division in the past, and through that understanding, to appreciate
2. Jill E. Fisch is a Professor at the Fordham University School of Law and is the
Director of its Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law.
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the manner in which the Division must continue to evolve and respond
to meet the new challenges of today.
It is my great honor to introduce the panel to you.
Lee Pickard, as I said, all the way on the end there, was the Director
of the Division of Market Regulation from 1973 to 1977. He is
currently Senior Partner of Pickard & Djinis, a Washington, D.C. law
firm that he formed in 1978 to specialize in securities and corporate law
and related litigation. Mr. Pickard has an A.B. from Colgate University
and an LL.D. from Harvard Law School.
Next to him, if I'm getting things right, is Andrew Klein, who was
the Director of the Division of Market Regulation from 1977 to 1979.
Mr. Klein started at the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") in 1973. He is currently a partner at Schiff Hardin & Waite,
where he concentrates his practice in corporate and securities law with
special emphasis on federal securities law disclosure, regulatory
compliance, and enforcement matters. I have to think that has got to
keep him busy about twenty-seven hours a day right now. Mr. Klein
holds both a B.A. and a J.D. from the University of Chicago.
Next to him is Richard Ketchum, who was the Director of the
Division of Market Regulation from 1984 to 1991. He currently serves
as President and Deputy Chairman of The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.
I am delighted to inform you that starting this fall he will also be joining
the Fordham Law School faculty as an Adjunct Professor, so those of
you in the audience that are first- and second-year students, you will
have the opportunity to get more details on his thoughts by signing up
for his securities classes next year. Immediately prior to assuming his
current position at NASDAQ, Mr. Ketchum served as President of the
NASD. Before he joined the staff of the SEC in 1977, he was associated
with the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. He holds a
B.A. from Tufts and a J.D. from NYU School of Law.
Brandon Becker was the Director of the Division of Market
Regulation from 1994 to 1996. He is currently a Partner at Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering where he heads the firm's broker-dealer practice. He
started at the SEC in 1978 and worked his way, as I understand it,
through the ranks. He holds a B.A. from the University of Minnesota, a
J.D. from the University of San Diego, and an LL.M. from Columbia
University.
Catherine McGuire, next to him, is the Chief Counsel and Associate
Director of the Division of Market Regulation. During her career with
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the SEC, she served primarily in the Division of Market Regulation in
positions of increasing responsibility. She has a B.A. from the
University of Michigan and a J.D. from the University of Kansas.
Next to her, Robert Colby has been Deputy Director of the Division
of Market Regulation since 1993. Prior to that he served as Chief
Counsel of the Division and Branch Chief of the Division's Office of
Market Structure. Mr. Colby has a B.A. from Bowdoin College and a
J.D. from Harvard Law School.
Finally, Annette Nazareth is the current Director of the Division of
Market Regulation, a position she has held since March of 1999. Prior
to joining the Commission, she was Managing Director and Counsel at
Salomon Smith Barney where she was Deputy Head of the Capital
Markets Legal Group. She also previously served as Senior Vice
President and Senior Counsel of Lehman Brothers, and prior to that was
associated with the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell. She received
her A.B. from Brown University, something that my husband would be
very happy to hear, and her J.D. from the Columbia University School
of Law.
Last but not least, I would like to introduce your moderator for this
evening, Kenneth Rosen. Ken serves as the current Corporate Center
Fellow, a position that he has held since this past July. Ken came to
Fordham from the SEC, which is, I guess, how he knows about all these
people and about the Division of Market Regulation, since he served as
Special Counsel in the Division of Market Regulation. Prior to that he
was associated with Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson. He has a
B.S.I.L.R. from Cornell University and a J.D. from Yale Law School.
I would particularly like, before I turn the program over to Ken, to
acknowledge Ken's pivotal role in organizing tonight's program. It was
Ken's idea last fall to focus on market regulation, and I don't think he
could have selected a better subject or assembled a stronger group of
panelists. He really was the leader in structuring this program, coming
up with the idea, and getting all of these good people to join us tonight.
I know you want to hear from them and not me, so without any
further ado let me turn the program over to Ken.
ALBERTA. DeSTEFANO LECTURE
PANEL DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thank you, Jill.
Let me add my gratitude to our panelists for joining us this evening,
despite their busy schedules. I know Annette, for example, actually had
to come from testifying on Capitol Hill today and had to make her way
to New York to join us. We thank her and everyone else who is here as
well.
It would be, as Jill suggested, difficult to imagine a panel better
prepared to discuss market regulation issues. Together, our panelists
have accumulated decades of experience on these matters.
Tonight we will explore some highlights of the history of the SEC's
Division of Market Regulation ("Market Reg") and the challenges ahead
for market regulators. Now that the Division has celebrated the thirtieth
anniversary of its inception, it is especially significant to recognize the
importance of the Division's history and its impact on market structure
in the United States. Were he to assess the Division's past and current
challenges, Yogi Berra might observe, "it's dej't vu all over again."3 So
many issues seem to continue to resurface, and the past efforts to
address those issues may reveal solutions to current problems.
When I worked for the Commission, I quickly realized the value of
studying prior staff action when addressing a new problem. While
reviewing past staff efforts, it amazed me how prescient the staff could
be. Sometimes a release would identify and reserve an issue that would
become critical years later, or it would present an approach to a
particular problem that could be reapplied at a later date.
I think our discussion tonight will be revealing, not only in
providing a sense of the significance of the Division's work and its
accomplishments, but also in shedding light on some of the challenges
ahead that we will consider later this evening.
With that, it is probably best to start at the beginning. Some of you
may know that prior to the Division's creation, the Division of Trading
3. Although this expression is commonly attributed to the former New York
Yankees catcher Lawrence Peter "Yogi" Berra, Berra himself denied originating this
expression and other popular expressions commonly attributed to him. See generally
YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK "I DIDN'T REALLY SAY EVERYTHING I SAID" (Workman
Publishing 1998).
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and Markets ostensibly dealt with a wide range of issues, including
market regulation and other matters. In the 1970s, the Commission
decided to reorganize the staff and to divide up functions between
operating divisions. Chairman William Casey at the time explained that:
The Commission believes this new structure will provide a sharper
focus on the priority tasks of the Commission, more effective use of the
Commission's resources, and the development, through closer
supervision and broader avenues of advancement, of effective and
leadership capabilities for the future as more of the younger staff assume
specific operating responsibilities.4
My guess is that some of the people on this stage earlier in their
careers might have been the types of babes in arms to whom the
Chairman was referring. This is a copy of the Release from August 1,
1972 announcing the reorganization. It is a short document, but I am
sure that its length does not denote the complexity of the thinking that
went into the reorganization.
I thought that we would start with Lee Pickard. Maybe you can
give us some insight into the thinking behind the process for creating a
separate Division of Market Regulation.
MR. PICKARD: Good evening.
Bill Casey, of course, was Chairman of the SEC at the time that the
Division of Market Regulation was formed, and you all probably
remember him for his reorganization efforts at the CIA. He actually was
Chairman of the SEC for some period of time, and I was Special
Counsel to Bill Casey.
He was concerned at the time that perhaps the combination of
regulation and enforcement was not working as well as it should work. I
suppose the predecessor to the Division of Market Regulation, Trading
and Markets, had been around for probably in excess of two or three
decades. It was his notion that there should be a separation of the
enforcement and the regulation functions.
A lot went into that: the notion that regulation concentrates on
investor protection, competition, and burdens of regulation, whereas
enforcement as a function tends to focus on compliance, deterrence, and
the ease of enforcing laws. Therefore, I think Bill's notion was that the
head of both of these functions was not as operative or as successful as it
4. Securities Act Release No. 5,287 (Aug. 1, 1972), available at 1972 SEC
LEXIS 98, at * 1-*2.
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could be, so he would separate those two, which thereby gave rise to the
Division of Market Regulation.
I think he had other concerns, and so did the Commission as a
whole, because he consulted with other Commissioners on this. He was
interested in a redeployment of assets and a more pointed and focused
enforcement group. Of course, that is what he achieved when this
happened.
However, he wanted the concentration of efforts in these particular
areas to be led by different people. Therefore, the separation occurred.
Market Regulation essentially took the functions that were in Trading
and Markets - mainly, the regulation of broker-dealers, exchanges,
self-regulatory organizations, SIPC,5 and financial responsibility - and
the enforcement was deposited with the new Division of Enforcement.
Over the years, if you look back on that functionality, it is
interesting to see how it played out, because I don't think anyone would
ever suggest that the two be recombined. It did, in fact, prove to be a
very effective reorganization. The Division of Enforcement went on to
achieve fame in itself, and of course Market Regulation had its platter
filled from that point on.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Now, Lee, early on it seems like the new
Division was not lacking for any business, even though it was new.
There were so many issues being bandied about that remain very salient
today, thirty years later. There was the formation of the listed options
markets, as well as the Uniform Net Capital Rule.
Can you give us a little bit of a sense of what was driving the
agenda and the setting of that agenda back at the time?
MR. PICKARD: Well, Ken, you know, what drives an agenda of
any Division probably is primarily determined by external factors, and
that certainly was the case back in 1974 and 1975.
The most pressing issue that we had before the Division at that time
was the fixed commission rate issue. There were two pressing issues, to
be more complete about this. There was the unfixed commission rate
issue and there was the financial responsibility issue of the broker-dealer
community, both of them driven by events that were developed in the
past.
5. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation was created by the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2003).
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The unfixed commission rate era, of course, was something that
started in 1792, which is when rates were first fixed. It was not until
perhaps a decade or two before the rates were unfixed that we began to
see cracks in that scheme or in that process.
The SEC essentially was passive in the role of unfixed rates for so
many years and was forced to become more active as the New York
Stock Exchange and others pressed to hold the fixed rates in place as
economic factors were driving them apart. Essentially the SEC did not
have an effective program to measure, implement, or operate fixed rates.
As the third market, give-ups, and cracks arose in the methodology for
determining rates, there was a pressing need to do something about that.
The Division's role at that time was one of hearings, inquiries, and
coordination with the Congress and with the Commission, in an effort to
come up with a solution. The obvious solution became apparent as we
continued to press this issue, and that was that the rates no longer could
be sustainable.
We consumed an enormous amount of time on that issue. It
probably took up 30 or 40 percent of the resources of the Division-and
that is just supporting the Commission in what it was trying to do. We
were trying to predict, first of all, what we could do; secondly, what
would be the consequences of that act.
We also had to deal with the industry. The industry in this case was
comfortable with fixed rates. It is like any other business-slow to
change and apprehensive about what might occur, and perhaps
unreasonably apprehensive. As time went on, and as the commission
rates were eventually phased out, it became apparent to the industry as a
whole that fixed rates were perhaps a drag on their profitability and their
success, as opposed to a basis for their profitability and their success.
So that was a major issue that we had to deal with, Ken.
Another major issue, again driven by external events, not by our
own agenda, was the financial crisis in the late-1960s. The industry was
confronted with the inability to process trades on a timely basis, to deal
with the record-keeping brought about by the precipitous increase in
volume, and the demise of approximately 100 different firms. This
caused us, the Division, to launch into a serious inquiry as to the net
capital bases of these firms and the need for better methodologies for
completing trades. All this occurred as the Division was formed and
during the early years of the Division, coupled by the fact that the
Congress had passed a SIPC law which guaranteed, in essence, the value
ALBERTA. DeSTEFANO LECTURE
of customer securities in custody to the extent of $500,0006, which was a
serious impetus upon us to do something about it.
Those were, in a broad sense, Ken, some of the major issues, but
there were others as well. Because of the fallout of the fixed rates, there
were market structure issues. The industry was innovative with products
at that time. They came in with the option exchanges, which I am sure
Andy can articulate to you all. And so we never had a lack of a program
or problems and issues before us.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Thanks.
I think that you tell a story where there certainly was a lot of action
early on, and I suppose on some level perhaps one can say you were
rewarded with more authority as a result of the early work of the
Division at that time and of the Commission simultaneously.
One of the watershed events has to be the passage of amendments
to the federal securities laws in 1975, 7 which really beefed up the
Commission's authority and, I think, by relation the Division's
authority.
Maybe, Andy, you could talk a little bit about what the role of the
staff was in the promulgation of those types of changes to the securities
laws, and also the reaction of industry once the Commission started to
actually exercise this authority.
MR. KLEIN: I'd be happy to do that.
I would like to continue from where Lee's story ended and
elaborate just a little bit, because it does not come naturally to one to
think of all of the things that fixed rates of commissions did to the
structure of the markets and to different segments of the industry and
investing public, and how slow the Commission was to catch on to their
interconnectedness-everybody was.
You have to go back to the Securities Exchange Act8 before it was
amended by the 1975 Acts Amendments 9 to see just how tiny and
narrow the Commission's authority was in several enormously important
respects.
6. See id. § 78fff-3.
7. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1975 Acts
Amendments].
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2003)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
9. See 1975 Acts Amendments, supra note 7.
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There was a whole menu of things in old Section 19 of the Act at
that time that gave the Commission very limited power to fiddle with
and change exchange rules.'0 One of the things on that list, however,
was the ability to ensure that exchanges had rules fixing "reasonable"
rates of commission. Well, after decades, somewhere in the late-1960s
or early-1970s, the Commission began to say, "Well, we don't have any
idea what a reasonable rate of commission is." The Commission then
held endless hearings where people came in to defend and to attack the
fixed rates, during which various things were learned about market
structure that startled the Commission. The Commission learned that
the markets of the early 1970s had come a long way since the Special
Study in 1963 done by my partner, Milton Cohen."
Problems emerged about who could be a member of an exchange.
Why was membership so important? Foreign membership, my
goodness, that was a whole separate issue. Further, the securities
industry objected vociferously to the idea that institutions could
becomes members of exchanges. Then you start to think about why
foreign broker-dealers and institutions would want to do this. Well, one
reason was the absence of a discount from the fixed rate for non-
members of the exchanges-even for broker-dealers. Why, wondered
the Commission, don't we have that built in there? Along the way, a
move in this direction was made, but the fixed rate system couldn't be
saved.
Institutions, like investment companies, were being sued by people
because they hadn't formed a broker-dealer to join an exchange to take
back a portion of the enormous amounts of fixed commissions that they
were paying. They were spending billions on commissions for no
particular reason other than the fixed rate. Plus, we had
institutionalization of the market. People didn't know what that meant.
We had a gigantic amount of institutional trading that all of a sudden
had overtaken the markets. The small trading by individual retail
investors was understood to be important, because we've got to take care
of retail investors-since it was assumed that they cannot take care of
themselves-but institutions thought that at least they could take care of
themselves. Nonetheless, they had to pay the same thing for doing a
10. See Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2003).
11. See Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the SEC, H.R. Doc. No.
88-95 pt. 1, at 482. (1963) [hereinafter Special Study].
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50,000-share trade as I did to do a 100-share trade. This made no sense.
Here, you just multiply the rate times the number of shares traded, and
that's what you have to pay-you know, a fixed rate. Well, it was
absurd.
The pressure that fixed rates exerted on what people wanted to do
as a competitive matter was extraordinary. The regional exchanges said,
"Well, we can't compete. No one wants to buy our last-sale
information. We make better markets, but no one can even see them."
You know, that kind of complaining. There was something to that.
They began to admit institutions to gain their business.
After looking at the anticompetitive effects of fixed commissions,
the Commission also began to look closely at other anticompetitive
things that were going on. What about that funny Rule 394 of the New
York Stock Exchange prohibiting off-board trading?
12
We collected comments and had to do a study about the effects of
off-board trading rules after the 1975 Acts Amendments were passed
because the statute commanded it. I think we collected comments in a
room at the SEC-it was Room 394. The Commission began to put all
of this together.
Even before the 1975 Acts Amendments, Irv Pollack, who had been
the head of Trading and Markets before it was split into the Divisions of
Market Regulation and Enforcement, had already promulgated two
fairly forceful ideas. One was that there should be a consolidated tape.
The other was that there should be a consolidated quotation system.
These would collect and put out to the public last sales and bids and
offers from all markets on a consolidated basis.
Industry advisory groups were formed to address these two ideas at
a time before there was a Federal Advisory Committee Act. 3 As a
result, dialogues with the staff about such concepts took place in
complete candor. Leaders of the industry got behind both ideas, saying
"Look, we really need this thing. We've got complicated markets here.
There are increased liquidity demands due to institutional trading.
12. NYSE Rule 394 was renumbered as Rule 390 on March 31, 1976. Rule 390
prohibited members of the NYSE from trading, as a principal, any listed securities in
the over-the-counter ("OTC") market. The SEC approved the NYSE proposal to repeal
Rule 390 in 2000. See Order Approving Proposed Change to Rescind Exchange Rule
390, Exchange Act Release No. 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175 (May 10, 2000).
13. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. app. (2003)).
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We've got to lace this stuff together in some fashion that produces more
liquidity, more connectedness, and keeps the whole pricing structure
straight. So we've got to start to integrate these things."
Out of those advisory group studies came the affirmation that there
should be a consolidated tape and that there should be a consolidated
quotation system. I've forgotten now, but they also had something
produced suggesting an overall rule for dealing with block trading as
well, I think.
MR. PICKARD: Clearing.
MR. KLEIN: Meanwhile, committees in Congress were studying
these things. Plus the Commission was doing it from the vantage point
of its hearings on fixed commission rates.
Finally, the Commission produced-it may not have if it had not
been forced to do it by market distortions resulting from fixed rates-
papers, like in 1972 "The Future Structure of the Securities Markets,"' 4
saying that we should do away with prohibitions on foreign membership
and at least adjust fixed rates of commission. Then, they produced the
Commission's wonderful White Paper on the Structure of the Central
Market System." When I got to the SEC, the handy phrase was "a
central market system," not a "national market system."
The White Paper set out some very good ideas: we want to integrate
and expose to each other all buying and selling interest in the country
through technology; we want to have a public preference rule, preferring
public orders over dealer buying and selling interest; we want to have
time and price priority governing the way everyone's orders interact; we
ought to have a fair system where it doesn't make any difference where
the order originates or goes in the country for execution-it will be
executed in a national queue. Wouldn't that just be great?
The authority that the Commission had to do any of this was
nonexistent before the 1975-Acts Amendments. At that time, the rules
that were promulgated to create a consolidated tape and a consolidated
quote system were under Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, which then,
as now, gives the Commission the power to require broker-dealers and
14. SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 37 C.F.R. §
6286 (Feb. 2, 1972).
15. See SEC, Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
Structure of a Central Market System (March 29, 1973).
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exchanges to file reports with the Commission.' 6 Nobody imagined that
meant you could force those guys to adopt systems of consolidating last
sale and quote information, or force the Exchange to share its monopoly
dominion over its last sale and quote information. The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) was not a great fan of either idea.
There was quite a lot of back and forth between the NYSE and the
Commission staff arguing, "Yeah, you are really going to have to do
this," and the NYSE responding, "No, we don't," "We will sue you,"
and "You don't have the authority." The Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975 were intended to end that debate, adding to the Commission's
authority. It was clear that the Commission was on somewhat weak
ground in trying to get where it wanted to go from a regulatory
standpoint without additional power from a revised statute. Further,
Congress had now held its own lengthy studies of the securities industry
and wanted to produce something. I think the Senate was really the side
that was more interested in something like a central market system and
what that might be about. The House was more interested in the SEC
having increased authority over self-regulatory organizations like the
NYSE.
The exchanges didn't even have to file rules with the SEC before
the 1975 Acts Amendments were passed. Rules used to come in, and
there was some sort of "no action letter" non-disapproval process. I
mean, it was tremendously weak. The SEC did not have a grip on the
financial markets of this country and had virtually no authority to gain
such a grip.
When the 1975 Acts Amendments were finished, the Commission
had acquired plenty of authority, and it really kind of knocked the
industry on its behind. First, the securities industry got socked in the
head because the Amendments did away with fixed commission rates.
Fixed commissions were ridiculous and falling apart anyway, and they
simply had to be done away with. Then, the whole structure supported
by fixed rates started to collapse, leading to massive consolidations in
the securities industry.
Soon thereafter, somebody came up with the idea, I guess, a little
bit later-I can't remember just when that was started-of being a
discount broker. Everybody started to say, "Okay, there are no fixed
commissions, but we are still going to charge a lot of money for our
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (2003).
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brokerage services." Then, somebody took out an ad saying, "Well, I
won't. I will charge you a really cheap rate and get all the business."
That was Charles Schwab, I think. These were very profound things.
The way the amendments made by the 1975 Acts Amendments
were structured was amusing. I keep talking about institutional
membership on exchanges in part because one of the great things in the
1975 Acts Amendments' legislative history was the Senate Committee
telling the SEC that its old Rule 19(c)(2), which Harvey Pitt, who then
was the Chief Counsel of the Division of Market Regulation at the time I
arrived here-
MR. PICKARD: He was the first Chief Counsel of the Division of
Market Regulation.
MR. KLEIN: That's right.
-was a disgraceful act by the Commission, one that should never
be repeated. Harvey had written a huge tome, at Chairman Bill Casey's
request, to support a rule that was going to keep institutions off
exchanges and preserve exchanges as public markets rather than private
clubs and all that sort of great stuff.17 But underneath, driving all of this,
is money, okay? If institutions got on the exchanges and recaptured
their affiliates' commissions, that would be the end of fixed rate. It was,
as my Chief Counsel Roger Blanc put it one day, "If you pray hard
enough you can make water run uphill." We managed to get by that.
MR. COLBY: That Release was totally incomprehensible to
everybody.
MR. KLEIN: No, it's not incomprehensible to me. I will explain it.
[Laughter.]
The most important thing that Harvey's Release really did is to
utterly change the manner in which releases are written at the SEC. If
you look back at the old releases any time before 1972, you will find
that SEC releases were a couple of pages, and they sort of said, "Well,
we're doing this and here's the text of the rule," and, you know, that's it.
Well, Harvey wrote an encyclopedia to explain Rule 19b-2-trying to
make water run uphill.
17. See Proposal to Adopt Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-2 Concerning
Membership on Registered Securities Exchanges for Other Than Public Purposes,
Exchange Act Release No. 9,716 (Aug. 3, 1972), available at 1972 SEC LEXIS 479;
Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-2 Concerning Membership on
Registered Securities Exchanges for Other Than Public Purposes, Exchange Act
Release No. 9,623 (May 30, 1972), available at 1972 SEC LEXIS 428.
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MR. COLBY: It was incomprehensible.
MR. KLEIN: It was a masterful thing.
[Laughter.]
MS. NAZARETH: Masterfully incomprehensible.
MR. KLEIN: Ever since then, if anybody was writing what they
regarded as a serious or important release at the SEC, it has to be long
with lots of footnotes, and they have been that way ever since. There is,
after all, an Administrative Procedure Act to pay attention to.
Anyway, after all that Senatorial criticism of Rule 19b-2, what do
we find in the 1975 Acts Amendments but a new Section 11 (a)! That
section, as was the case under Rule 19b-2, prohibited members of
exchanges from trading for their own accounts, accounts of affiliates, or
for their managed accounts.' 8 In short, absent an exception-and there
were some in Section l1(a) just as there were under Rule 19b-2-
members could not effect transactions on an exchange for their own
accounts, the accounts of affiliates or for the accounts of money
managed by them. Congress didn't apply that same principle to the
over-the-counter market, but the Commission was given authority to do
that.
Why is Section 11 (a) in there? Well, the surface chatter was: "That
is in there because it is just terrible to combine brokerage and money
management; that is just a great evil." You may notice now, though, if
you look at that Section, that Congress, two or three years ago, passed
something leaving most of it in place but taking out the part about
managed money, 19 which formed the entire rationale for installing
Section 11 (a) in the first place. However, that was never the real reason
for enacting it. What it really was about was that no one knew at the
time whether commissions were really going to be unfixed. The New
York Stock Exchange and those guys were fighting to the last man to
keep fixed rates in place. They were running around to every
Congressman and everybody who would listen, saying, "Grass will grow
on Wall Street if you unfix commissions. You must not do this. It will
be the end of the world as we know it."
So proponents of fixed rates had built the anti-institutional
membership provision into the 1975 Acts Amendments as a legislative
stopper to prevent institutions from joining the exchanges-the very
18. See Exchange Act § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k (2003).
19. See id.
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thing that Rule 19b-2 was designed to do-in the hope that rates would
remain fixed. Of course, before all this, as I noted earlier, institutions
had been joining regional exchanges anyway (on the regionals), and they
had been cutting into fixed rates by capturing what their institutional
affiliates paid. And rates were unfixed in the end anyways. Thus, the
thing was not what it appears to be on the surface, as is in so many cases
with changes in the law.
How do they put the 1975 Acts Amendments together? Probably
by using their heads and saying, "What we're looking at as a market
structure now just sounds preposterous." You know, my cat would
know that most of the stuff they were looking at was artificial. It is hard
to understand how the old market structure managed to last as long as it
did. But the Commission did not have tremendous power to do much
about it until those Amendments were passed.
There was a lot of product in terms of industry study and input-
good thinking coming out of the industry and good thinking by
academicians-that fed into the staff's knowledge and way of looking at
the problems, all of which Congress attempted to address in an omnibus
way in what became the 1975 Acts Amendments. Then, of course, after
they were passed, there was the problem of implementing them. But
that is another and a longer story.
Now, armed with the power to have a National Market System-
and I can speak with some emotion about this because I was doing most
of it-the Commission really could do what it thought was right. And
so we went along proposing what we thought was right: we've got the
consolidated tape up; we are going to have a consolidated process and
we got that up.
Then we said that the next problem that we really need to address is
limit order protection. We are going to have to do something where best
execution becomes feasible for people wherever they are in the world.
We are going to have to have an order rating system so that people don't
pick markets for bad reasons. And, by golly, we are going to put all of
this monopoly stuff (like off-board trading rules) out of business. Well,
that lasted about as long as maybe the first six months of my being
Director after you, Lee.
We had a rule proposal out there to do away with off-board trading
rules.2 ° Well, that became the next "the world will come to an end if
20. See Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 13,662 (June
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you do away with off-board trading rules." I remember Chairman
Harold Williams2' calling me up at home one night and saying, "Andy,
are you really sure about this? I'm not so sure about this." It was the
beginning of the end, because my certainty about doing away with the
rules didn't really matter when other guys from Wall Street started
talking to him.
MR. PICKARD: Don't you think in large measure, having received
all this authority, that basically the SEC has stepped back and said,
"Okay, the industry can evolve and develop its own mechanisms for
trading?" And, in fact, they have done a fairly good job of doing that.
Most of the things that you've talked about-best execution,
protection of limit orders-are essentially being accomplished today,
without the Division having been actively pursuing it.
MR. KLEIN: One has to start with what Congress said has its
reason for passing those National Market System provisions. The
reason was because fragmentation of the United States securities
markets into separate, unconnected pieces is bad for the collection of
liquidity, bad for the production of narrow spreads, bad for executions,
and so on.
I thought we were making progress there for a while about getting
rid of fragmentation. I am going to leave it to my successors to explain
how in God's name we've gotten from that point to an even more
fragmented state now than anyone ever could have imagined in 1975.
So I will pass it on to them.
MR. COLBY: It is merely illusion.
MR. KETCHUM: Well, I only have to ask one question, Andy,
because there was one thing that, after Harold Williams made that call,
you did end up working through approval, and that was the ITS, the
Intermarket Trading System.22
23, 1977), available at 1977 SEC LEXIS 1441; Off-Board Trading Restrictions,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,802 (July 25, 1977), available at 1977 SEC LEXIS 1190.
21. Harold M. Williams served as Chairman of the Commission from 1977-1981.
See SEC Chairmen & Commissioners, Securities and Exchange Commission Historical
Society, at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/museum_chairmen.php (last visited
Jan. 26, 2004).
22. See Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No.
14,416 (Jan. 26, 1978) (noting progress on implementing ITS), available at 1978 SEC
LEXIS 2339.
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Just out of curiosity, as you approved that, would it have been your
bet that it would remain the primary linkage system for brokerage
securities in the year 2003?
MR. KLEIN: The only reason there is an Intermarket Trading
System is because the New York Stock Exchange came up with it. We
had them on the run. They were definitely on the run, because we were
going to do preposterous things to the way they were doing business.
You know, we were going to change it, and we had the power to change
it. They knew we had the power to change it, so things were going to
hell, and they had to come up with something.
I remember that Ralph Ferrara, who then was Executive Assistant-
Legal Counsel to the Chairman, came down, closed the door to my
office, slammed a memo we had written knocking the ITS idea down on
my desk, saying, "Harold wants to know why you can't be more
cooperative. Why can't you let these guys do what they want to do? It's
like Vietnam. Just say, 'We see the light at the end of the tunnel' and
end the war. You know, forget about it."
MR. BECKER: It was like Vietnam.
MR. KLEIN: I said, "ITS isn't going to work. It would be
preposterous." Well, of course, it was at least a beginning. It is now
and ever will be only that. It doesn't fix the problem, and it doesn't do
much of anything.
MR. BECKER: Is it irrelevant?
MR. KLEIN: It is totally irrelevant. Nobody uses it. I mean, the
good underlying idea-and built on the ITS, of course-is that trade-
throughs are bad. Rules to prevent them actually might protect better
bids or offers that are outstanding in the country so that you don't
execute at an inferior price and pass that guy up.
But there is no discussion anymore about the idea of time priority,
which was and remains a fairly key idea. Maybe that will come up
again someday. But at least you weren't supposed to do a trade
anywhere in the country at an inferior price. Trade-throughs threatened
to become a maelstrom that could wind up in the court system. But the
trade-through rules said only you are to "avoid" trade-throughs-and
they're all self-regulatory organization rules, not SEC rules.
What happens if you don't "avoid" a trade-through, and you do
one? Well, the other guy can complain, he sends a message through the
system, they take it upstairs, they play jacks with it, and three minutes
later, you'll find out whether or not you got satisfied. The markets never
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moved that slowly, and they sure don't today, so it's become a worthless
system.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Well, Rick, maybe you want to pick up a
little bit, now having a different perspective-from that of working at an
SRO as opposed to talking to an SRO-on what the relationship was
with self-regulatory organizations as these National Market System
principles started to be expanded in their application over time, for
instance, by adding to the list of National Market System securities.
MR. KETCHUM: Sure. Thanks, Ken.
You know, as you can hear now, this is about the time that Market
Reg stopped getting interesting. In fact, I still remember-I spent a few
months in Market Reg and went off for a year on a special study of the
options markets,23 and I came back because it was more fun being there.
I guess, Ken, something that you had pointed to, and that probably
is a good example of the interaction with self-regulation, was the first
step that the Commission took at the other end of that story Andy talked
to you about, to expand the types of securities that would participate in
the National Market System.24 In non-code terms, that meant that the
Commission for the first time expanded the breadth of the National
Market System rules away from securities traded on the New York
Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange-of, if you will,
what then would be called listed securities-to securities traded on
NASDAQ.
To understand some of the context of the 1970s-because all of you
know NASDAQ is this incredibly vibrant and extremely important
market with the most significant securities in American on it now-
MR. PICKARD: Was that your view when you were Director?
MR. KETCHUM: That wasn't NASDAQ then. That wasn't so
much NASDAQ in 1975, or 1973 when it started, or even 1977 and
1978. NASDAQ was small-basically trading about a tenth of the
volume on a dollar volume standpoint of New York Stock Exchange
securities. Interestingly enough, at that point, there was even less
volume than the American Stock Exchange, and the market cap of the
securities traded there, with very few exceptions, was extremely small.
23. See SEC, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE
OPTIONS MARKET 183-89 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter Options Special Study].
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (2003).
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There were, however, large securities beginning to develop and stay
on the NASDAQ market in the second half of the 1970s. Those
companies ranged from companies that were there for less than
appealing reasons, such as their CEO wanted to maintain voting control
and use non-voting stock, to a variety of companies in sort of the first
wave of technology companies, which felt more comfortable with a
market maker system and recognized the type of support that market
makers could provide. Enough advertisement.
That led to a refocus, because the NASDAQ environment was very
different than the New York Stock Exchange environment, and it
evolved from a very different place. It evolved from the pink sheet
market through the 1960s, which really had no real-time information
available of it, to the creation after the Special Study2 5-an indication of
how studies can have significant impact on the securities markets-in
1971 of NASDAQ26 and the first automated quotation system for those
securities not listed on an exchange.
But from that 1971 period, and up close to 1979, NASDAQ was
still a pretty curious market. The availability of the quotes of competing
market makers was only available to professionals, generally indeed
only available to other broker-dealers. The information out to the public
was, curiously, an average price--call it a representative bid and ask-
one of the best things ever gotten rid of by the SEC, which basically
meant that customers couldn't even know what people were willing to
pay to buy or sell their securities.
There was no last sale reporting. So outside of watching the
movements of the quotes and outside of persons who had access to those
quotes, being able to really effectively monitor the market or to be able
to monitor the quality of your execution was tough. That led the
Commission to move down the road of including NASDAQ securities.
One of the good things that Andy and other SEC staff did in helping
Congress with the 1975 Amendments was build a great deal of
flexibility in how the Act could operate, as well as a lot of inconsistent
and confusing and complex provisions that told people to do different
things.
25. See Special Study, supra note 11.
26. For a description of the evolution of NASDAQ, see About NASDAQ, at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/about-nasdaq_long.stm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
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One of those things was to give the Commission wide-ranging
ability to define what a National Market System security was, certainly
with respect to all equity securities-and, for that matter, even for
standardized options. The designation then of securities was about
moving some NASDAQ securities in that direction and choosing not to
move standardized options in, but to operate separately, through separate
authority, to try to impact that market, which took a few years thereafter.
I guess to try to directly answer your question, Ken, the interaction
with SROs, I think, was pretty interesting here.
For those of you who are law students, if I can leave you with one
thing from the standpoint of being an effective advocate for your clients,
it is get to know the sociology of the agency that you are attempting to
deal with. Get to understand what matters, what makes its heart beat,
and the fundamental premises and things that the agency cares about.
With the SEC that tends to be things like disclosure and
transparency, and tends usually, fortunately, not to be efforts to dictate
on a very tight basis each step in which people operate in trading in the
market. The SEC, and Market Reg in particular, as part of its sociology,
which I'm pleased has survived to this day, takes a pride in actually
trying to understand how the markets work-something about which it
also has a strong, quiet belief that nobody else in the Commission has
the foggiest clue about. That is again important from the legal
standpoint to understand, because the fact that-
MR. BECKER: We all enjoyed the HealthSouth trading halt. It was
a lot of fun for everyone involved, and we weren't consulted.
MR. KLEIN: How many guys have you had call in and ask,
"What's a trading halt?"
MR. KETCHUM: Forget training the law students.
MS. NAZARETH: It's a problem.
MR. KETCHUM: I think I'll stay away from that one.
With that understanding of how the markets work, there is, I think,
a risk averseness to Market Reg that has existed, at least since Andy,
that has impacted the way Market Reg tends to solve problems. The
National Market System Security piece is instructive in that, and the
relation to the NASD in moving it is also instructive in how SROs ought
to work when they are working well.
The first piece is, in picking up Andy's theme of destruction of
Western civilization, designating NASDAQ securities as NMS
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securities.27 Requiring last sale reporting for NASDAQ securities was
the next step in the road of destroying Western civilization as we know
it. I thought back, and in my almost fourteen years at the Commission,
we destroyed Western civilization as we knew it eleven times and
proposed to do it eight others.
MR. KLEIN: Now grass grows on computer screens, though.
MR. KETCHUM: Now I do worry about Western civilization being
destroyed.
[Laughter.]
But within that context there were genuine worries. This was a
market of illiquid securities, a market in which there wasn't a central
place where orders came, a market which defined itself-and, indeed,
built something unique in the United States-through market maker
sponsorship and connection with the fact that those dealers also were
involved in having customers and selling securities to those customers.
If you will, if there is one thing that has separated the U.S. over the
years, I think historically, both for the good and the bad, it has been the
willingness of dealers to take positions, and the incentives that have
been built into markets like NASDAQ to encourage them to do so. That
has had huge benefits in allowing smaller companies to be able to go
public much earlier than they would have otherwise. It has also had
some costs from conflicts of interest, which we will probably talk about
in the next hour and a half.
So the call was really much more a question of not whether there
should be last sale reporting, but how many securities and how badly
would we screw up if the whole market turned up and died and there
weren't any market makers the next day.
SROs at their best are reasonably good interpreters of the "Western
civilization dying" question while still representing one of their
constituencies, having some concern about their issuers and some
concern about the markets as a whole. Working with the NASD
basically led to the rollout of NMS securities.
It began with the forty largest securities, and then, after a fairly
quick period of time, the NASD figured that this was the greatest thing
since sliced bread, because institutions actually would begin to trade the
securities. They had some confidence now that the market worked, and
27. See Designation of National Market System Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 17,549, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,826 (Feb. 17, 1981).
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companies stayed. I think that was one of the key steps in really
expanding NASDAQ into a genuine competitor to the New York Stock
Exchange.
In short, Ken, SROs can, when they provide balanced advice,
contribute to effective policy development, and that was basically how
NMS securities began.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: I think that one of the other issues raised by
the philosophy behind NMS was just trying to make markets work better
in general.
Maybe we'll move on to Brandon and talk a little bit about the
efficiency of the clearance and settlement of securities trades in the
United States, which is something that has worked remarkably well,
when we talk about distinguishing ourselves from other systems. Maybe
you can talk a little bit about how the Division was able to get the
industry to significantly reduce settlement time during your tenure.
MR. BECKER: Sure.
The issue was a relatively straightforward one. When you buy
stock, you have to exchange, in effect, cash-good cash-versus the
value of the securities-good deliverable securities.
It used to be that if you did a trade today, it would be five days
before the cash moved against the securities. Every day of delay is a
day that something can go wrong, and mathematicians can quantify the
risk that is attached to that. It was reasonably clear to the world that
there would be less risk if you moved the cash against the securities in
three days instead of five.
The issue was how to move an industry with a very elaborate,
embedded infrastructure, dominated by doing things the way we did it
yesterday, from a "T+5.-"T" being trade date, five being settlement
date-environment to a "T+3" environment.
That process was one that, in terms of the technology of change, if
you will, is one that the Commission has replicated over and over again.
First, it starts putting out releases, so-called concept papers and white
papers to begin a debate. Second, it starts having advisory committees.
The advisory committees are generally peppered by various industry
participants. The advisory committees' duties are two-fold: they are
both to gather information and to make the case for the proposed action,
hopefully generating buy-in from the various industry leaders at the
same time with respect to that process.
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There is a parallel process, particularly in this context, that also
occurs frequent at the Commission-it reaches out to other government
agencies.
In this case, Chairman Greenspan and the Federal Reserve Board
agreed that the move from "T+5" to "T+3" made sense. Along the way,
picking up the New York Federal Reserve Bank as well as the Treasury
Department was equally important because as a result of this, a lot of
people were going to have their stock certificates either de-
materialized-that was the European word for destroyed-or otherwise
immobilized. That is really hard. It is a very hard generational thing. A
lot of people believed that the value of what they have is the value of a
piece of paper-it is what they have in their stock certificate.
We still have something very special in the United States-at least
we had it until the year 2000. This is that we have a broad individual
investor participation in our markets. That is very helpful on a lot of
fronts, so it's not something that you want to put at risk. If you contrast
that with the European market or an Asian market, where you are always
basically going to a universal bank to raise debt, it is a nice thing to have
a deep, liquid, individual investor market where you can raise equity
money. So you don't want to put those individuals at risk, but at the
same time, you've got to move to a more efficient, less risky
environment for settlement.
So what is that process I am describing? You try to get the buy-in
of the various industry groups. Then, you try to identify what are going
to be the problem children in terms of the technology and the
infrastructure. Next, you try to get other governmental agencies to be
supportive of the exercise.
There were within the industry some firms that, for whatever
reason-usually self-interest and their own archaic computer systems-
that didn't want to move. Then, there were a few academics who
wanted to go to "T+l"-that would mean settling on the next day-to
allow for better harmonization with some of the derivatives markets that
were in a "T+1" environment. But if you were to go to "T+1"-and that
is still something the industry is trying to work through-that would
push much harder the other infrastructure and the comparison process on
the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.
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So we ended up with "T+3." The SEC ended up adopting the rule.
As Milton Friedman-I think it was he-said: "The only ways in which
monopoly can last is when it has government backing."28
One of the things the SEC does is moderate industry disputes.
What it did in this case is it put its thumb on the scale and said, "We are
going to 'T+3,' and you recalcitrant firms who do not want to get there
are coming along with us. We are not going to take you to 'T+1,' but
we are going to 'T+3.'" 2 9 That gets repeated in lots of different places-
limit order display requirements, 0 where the leadership within the
industry may be moving in one direction.
But the only way to get there is to have the SEC adopt a rule, and
there the gain for the SEC-and the important judgment, the reason why
we want Annette and Bob and Caite to be experienced and have good
judgment, and hopefully have political appointees who listen to them-
is because you've got to make choices, or you are just having the
dominant voices in the industry trying to use governmental power to
enforce that power for whatever their business objectives are. There is a
lot of potential for abuse.
The dominant voices are big, know how to work the system,
understand the sociology of the agency, and can hire people like me to
dress it up. It is a way that things can be pressed upon the Agency. You
need experienced staff that can sort that self-interest from when the
industry needs to move to "T+3," and when there is actually a legitimate
safety and soundness aspect.
Now, in bringing along other aspects of the government-without
trying to front-run either Caite or Bob, one of the other stories that we
have not developed thus far on the panel is that the SEC exists within a
governmental milieu, and that, while it often is characterized in the press
as "turfy," creates a lot of pressures about how things get done.
The unfixing of commission rates cannot really be told in its
entirety unless you understand that in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,3' the New York Stock Exchange woke up to a potential
28. Bruce Sullivan, Friedman Slams DOJ for "Societal Regulation ", Conservative
News Service, at
http://www.conservativenews.org/InDepth/archive/l 99905/INDI 9990525d.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2003).
29 See Exchange Act Rule 15c6-1.
30 See Exchange Act Rule 11Acl-4.
31. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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application of the antitrust laws, and the Department of Justice was
bringing a series of litigation, putting at risk the fixed commission
32
rates.
You cannot tell the whole story of what has gone on in the
oversight of the derivatives markets, and in particular the creation of
new regulatory structures at the SEC, without knowing that the Federal
Reserve Board has been very protective of the banks and their balance
sheets. It has tried to retain a vertical oversight of that regime, so that
what the SEC has done has always been in the shadow of a bank
regulatory structure that in many respects is very different than the
broker-dealer regulatory structure.
You cannot tell that story of margin and whether or not changes
were made to margin without understanding what happened to
derivatives and the competing pressures from the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.
You cannot tell the NASDAQ story today without looking at the
Department of Justice and its re-innovated antitrust fascination, as well
as its fascination with the options markets.
So, on the one hand, those other forces can be allies, and they can
provide an institutional framework for the Commission's action and
show some broader support so that it is not too parochial. On the other
hand, they provide a discipline and a counterbalance to the Commission.
The short story on the back-office side, where the SEC is really
trying to preserve safety and soundness is often that the SEC must act
through uniform rules and standards. The Commission can be helpful in
setting standards so people can rely upon that. I think they have done
that over the years, and they have to maintain some ability to make
internal decisions in the future.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Before getting to that intersect between the
different regulators, maybe we can just talk about one more thing from
your tenure. Here in an academic environment we are particularly
interested in the impact of studies on policymaking. Really one of the
great market regulation studies was the "Market 2000 Report."33 Maybe
32 See Maryanne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.
L. REv. 475 (1984).
33. SEC Market 2000 Report: An Examination of Current Equity Market
Developments (1994), available at 1994 SEC LEXIS 137.
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you can just talk a little bit about why that report went forward and what
its impact has really been in terms of setting the agenda on market
regulation issues that followed.
MR. BECKER: There is an old saying, I think, in Washington,
"promise them anything, but give them a study." Generally, when you
want to do a four-corner stall, you do a study. Hopefully, it is not
entirely cynical. You might actually do a study because these are
complicated issues, you want to reach out to a broader community and
get their input, and as a result of that, hopefully, come to a more
informed and balanced judgment. The process of writing it and getting
people involved and working with the Commissioners helps form the
value consensus for what you do on individual issues.
MR. KLEIN: No!
MR. BECKER: It's academia. They have to believe this.
[Laughter]
MR. KLEIN: What are you smoking?
MR. BECKER: How can they sit in the library if they didn't believe
this?
[Laughter]
MR. KLEIN: Okay. Okay. Go on.
MR. BECKER: So that's an important value accomplishment for a
study. In the market structure area, I think the studies have been most
successful, going back to the Special Study3 4 from the 1960s, when the
Commission has done its own homework and gotten smart about a topic.
Then, when Harold Williams says to Andy, "Do you really believe it?"
and Andy says, "Yes," he can say it credibly, and Harold is prepared to
take the heat because they do have confidence in their own judgments.
Contrary to the caricatures in the press, most of the people who make
these decisions are worried about getting it right and are very concerned
about getting it wrong and the collateral consequences of getting it
wrong. Their ability to make a decision and implement it is enhanced, I
think, by doing the studies and developing an empirical base that gives
them confidence about the integrity of their judgment as well as the
ability to persuade others.
The successful study, I think, then moves beyond-if you had to
contrast the Special Study with the Institutional Investor Study35 -
34. See Special Study, supra note 11.
35. See SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st
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generalizations to action items. We've got to end up with some concrete
things that aren't suggestions for further study or another regression
analysis, but now we will require limit order display and move away
from eighth-point markets. There has to be something that then has
some legs to it and moves forward from that.
If anything, the one problem with some of the more academic
studies is they are more generalized in input, and they do not try to focus
on a particular action item at the end of the report. It is always a
"request for further study." I think the studies can be helpful, although
they do sometimes stall out.
The other thing that we need-and Lee and Andrew did this, and
the staff there now is doing it-is some real leadership when you do
these studies, because the advisory committees in the studies just
replicate the self-interest within the industry. You always have to have a
balanced advisory group, and then they all fight about their economic
self-interest and replicate that among the advisory group. That is useful
for the staff to understand the depth and nature of the individual issues,
but it doesn't get you anything out of the study unless you have a strong
leader who can then try to frame action items and move the thing
forward, in my view.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: We will now move on to Caite and Bob and
pick up on that other issue that you raised, which is the presence of
multiple regulators. It really seems that another one of the major
changes in the U.S. financial markets is an increased ability of financial
intermediaries from different sectors to compete to provide similar
services and products. Much of this was inspired by recent financial
services legislation.
Maybe, Bob and Caite, you can tell us a little bit about the
Division's role in the drafting, in particular, of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act3 6 as well as the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
("CFMA").37
MS. McGUIRE: Do you want to take the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act?
Sess. (1971).
36. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
37. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
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MR. COLBY: Sure.
First, I need to make an SEC disclaimer. We are required to tell
you that the views we express are not necessarily those of our colleagues
at the Commission or on the staff, and they are not ours if we get quoted
on them.
I wanted to contrast two different things that we did to show you
what I think worked well and what worked badly, if that's okay. The
first is Reg ATS.38  This is a Rule in which we designed what the
requirements were for markets that might technically be viewed as
exchanges. It was designed to address a problem that had been lurking
for many, many years. It was possible in an environment that was new,
because the Congress had given the Commission broad exemptive
authority from the statute. We weren't locked into a statute that had
been written thirty-forty years before; we were able to tailor it.
In that context, the Division took a group of its hardest-working and
smartest staff from the Office of Markets and sent them off for a very
long time to go and think about it. They went off and read everything
written on the subject. They talked to all the global thinkers on the
topic, and then they wrote memos on every issue. Then they finally
came up with a proposal that said "we think that one way to go about it
is this."
It went out as a Concept Release. 39 Everybody in the industry
commented from their own economic interest. It had two parts: one was
international, and one was domestic.
The Commission staff took those comments-took what I think
were the valid ones, discarded the ones that were purely self-
interested-came up with a proposal,4 ° and put it out for comment again.
The Commission got another round of comments. Some people got
tired after the first ones. They thought we were going to go back and
reread them-ha, ha. But there was another round of comments, after
which the Commission adopted this.4 '
38. Regulation Alternative Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 39,884, 63
Fed. Reg. 23,504 (Apr. 29, 1998); see Exchange Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Reg ATS].
39. Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, [1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,942 at 89,360 (May 23, 1997).
40. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,504 (Apr. 29, 1998).
41. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act
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It was extremely long, which meant that some parts got more close
scrutiny from the Commission than others. It was something that I
think, except for the parts added by other divisions, has stood up well to
the test of time. It is in operation today.
Let me contrast that to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act was passed by Congress. It was the culmination of
four or five bills. I know there were other bills which died in the
process.
Some sections of Gramm-Leach-Bliley were negotiated in a broom
closet underneath the Senate. There were some sections that were
written in the hall. Now there it is. Now it has been enacted, and it has
to be implemented in all its glory. Someday, somewhere, Congress will
get back to revisiting this, but in the meantime we have to live with this.
MS. McGUIRE: I guess a similar thing, in terms of working with
the staffs and the other agencies, has been the creation of the President's
Working Group,42 which was a response, I believe, to the first market
break. Rather quickly, that group moved to the issue of derivatives.
Over-the-counter derivatives can take many forms. They are
contracts. The Commission had actually started looking at them with
the first interest rate swap in 1980. These were not public studies.
These were the Chairman saying: "Something new is happening here. Is
it a security? Should we be regulating it, or should we allow the over-
the-counter markets to innovate?"
The Federal Reserve always knew the answer: the over-the-counter
markets should innovate. The SEC wanted to know more. We also
didn't want to undermine the options market, because an option is a kind
of derivative that the SEC clearly has authority over.
Meanwhile, back at the ranch-and I am working backwards
really-back in 1974, they created the CFTC,43 and they defined a
commodity as a series of agricultural things-anything other than
onions. So a security is a commodity too, and an over-the-counter
derivative could be a future if it was structured in a certain way.
Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998).
42. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets was established by
Executive Order. Executive Order 12,631 (March 18, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 9,421
(March 22, 1988).
43. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") was created by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
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So this created, as lobbyists coined the phrase, "legal uncertainty."
This crystallized for the President's Working Group. We worked
together-the staffs of all the agencies-to come up with a Working
Group Report on the OTC Derivatives Market and the CEA, or the
Commodities Exchange Act.44 In that, we recommended basically that
the legal uncertainty of the futures overlay be removed. The uncertainty
threatened to say that all over-the-counter derivatives really only should
be traded on futures exchanges registered with the CFTC. This seemed
ludicrous. In the process of doing that, that became a part of what is
known as the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which was
enacted in 2000.
In order to move a bill, there had to be tradeoffs and other things
added. So there were three things that were added to move the bill.
One, which is not relevant to the SEC, is reform of the oversight of
commodities exchanges, actually sort of moving back to the way Andy
described the pre-1975 Amendments authority of the SEC in some ways.
But there are two that were relevant to us. First of all, we had to
reach an agreement that replaced what had been known as the Shad-
Johnson Accord.45 There was a "no man's land" between the SEC and
the CFTC. The SEC regulated securities, including options on
securities; the CFTC regulated futures on broad-based indices.
However, no one regulated futures on single stocks or narrow-based
indices, and no one was allowed to trade them. They were prohibited.
So we had to resolve that, which involved an amazing integration of
the two laws for a market which, I think, trades very little. What it did
do was it put us on a pro-innovation theoretical discussion with this
diverse set of regulators who were all saying, "There shouldn't be a gap
just because there are two regulators, so products should be able to be
developed."
With respect to over-the-counter derivatives, the CFTC's authority
was clearly not applicable. Then, everybody said, "Well, what about the
44. See President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act (Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/otcact.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
45. The Shad-Johnson Accord was an agreement reached by the chairmen of the
SEC and the CFTC to divide jurisdiction over options and futures. This agreement was
passed into law as part of both the Securities Acts Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982), and the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No 97-444,
96 Stat. 2294 (1982).
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SEC?" We said, "Well, we weren't part of this deal." But at the end we
were.
What happened was very intelligent. It worked out quite well, for
no really good reason. It was one of these serendipitous things. Well, I
hope it worked out well. It may be too soon to tell.
It was made clear that if certain securities-based derivatives were
not options, they were not securities. But by the same token, the
principal provisions of the securities laws that regulate over-the-counter
markets in private placements, which is what OTC derivatives currently
are, were made applicable. So the anti-fraud and insider trading
provisions were applied, without defining the instrument to be securities.
It was interesting.
This law represented the most "take one from column A, two from
column B" decisions that have ever been made by the Congress. What
became evident from my perspective in working on the legislation since
the 1975 Amendments is a trend that each deal is more specific and
more highly negotiated. It makes the statute much harder to read, and it
undercuts the flexibility to deal with future problems broadly.
MR. BECKER: Is that because of less trustworthy agencies, do you
think, Caite? I mean, is the Hill just trying to cut its own deal?
MS. McGUIRE: I think it's because there are more highly paid
lobbyists. I think in the 1975 Amendments, the only person who could
afford a lobbyist was the New York Stock Exchange, and now every
major firm has one. With the increasing number of financial
conglomerates, which has been brought forward by Gramm-Leach-
Bliley, there are ample lobbyists and competing trade associations. I
always thought with Gramm-Leach-Bliley that the lobbyists could put
their kids through school, and they were far enough along that they
could put their grandchildren through school. It was a twenty-year
legislative thing.
So the good thing about the CFMA was that it actually passed in
one Congress.
MR. PICKARD: Caite, as you presently view those lobbyists, is
that a burden on the Division or is that an asset to the Division-the fact
that there are so many more trade groups and lobbyists approaching
you?
MS. McGUIRE: Both. It is really contextual. Good lobbyists give
information, and they facilitate reaching agreement. They bring people
together to accomplish their goal. If their goal is to frustrate you, then it
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is not good. If their goal is to actually make something happen, and they
are willing to make compromises, they can be helpful.
But with every person-Andy's idea of just being able to sit and
say, "What's right? What do I think is right?" is not something that
would describe our experience today. We are very aware of the people
around us who have views, and they have to be taken account of. So the
releases get longer, the footnotes get denser, but I still think we are able
to act and to move ahead.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Annette, one of the amazing things is at the
same time that the Division was dealing with the legislative process for
the CFMA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and subsequently with the
implementation of those statutes, the Division also redoubled its efforts
vis-A-vis the National Market System, really trying to help with the
integration and transparency of securities markets.
Could you share your thoughts on a couple of these efforts, such as
improved disclosure of order execution and routing practices, as well as
the development of linkages between options markets?
MS. NAZARETH: I'll be happy to.
I think one of the most interesting aspects of this panel is the color
that you have been getting in terms of the difficulties in actually
achieving what is on our collective wish lists for the National Market
System.
Andy asked a good question early on, which was, "How can it be
that after all this time we still have fragmentation?" I think that is a very
appropriate question.
I think certainly one of the lessons that I have learned-and I think
I learned it first from Arthur Levitt46 when I first arrived at the
Commission-is that there are sometimes opportunities that arise that
you do not expect that give you the chance to make your case at a time
when the industry may be in less of a position to object. Certainly, those
are the times that you want to seize the moment. Certainly, with
NASDAQ there were a number of changes that we saw in the
marketplace that came out of the settlement.
46. Arthur Levitt, Jr. served as Chairman of the Commission from 1993-2001. See
SEC Chairmen & Commissioners, Securities and Exchange Commission Historical
Society, at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/museumchairmen.shtml (last visited
Sept. 1, 2003).
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With the options markets, it was actually somewhat more market-
driven, and somewhat driven by the Department of Justice. We had had
many years of options markets in which they were certainly permitted to
multiply list. In fact, we were under a rule that said that there should be
no action taken that would limit the multiple listing of options products
on different markets, but in fact, we really had overwhelmingly separate
options markets that each traded their own products. In that case,
obviously the fact that the Department of Justice took some interest in it
and was looking at the issue prompted the options markets to think again
about how they were conducting their business.
Probably equally important was the fact that the Commission, for I
guess the first time in about twenty-five years, was in the process of
registering a new exchange. In this case, it was the International
Securities Exchange, which was to be the first fully electronic options
exchange.47 There is nothing like good, old-fashioned competition to
shake everybody up, so here you had a new electronic marketplace that
was poised to come on board and that intended to multiply list the top
600 options in the markets, and so there was sort of a general panic.
Therefore, the options markets started multiply listing. That obviously
was, I think, very good news in general for investors, because now you
have competition and a narrowing of spreads and the like.
With that came some complexities. We actually got to work on
some of the unfinished business that Rick probably had worked on in his
Options Study,48 going back a little ways. We actually started thinking
about implementing some of the National Market System principles to
the options markets, including linking those markets.
Again, it was a situation where the markets were all complaining
about how they couldn't reach each other to get to the best prices in the
market, and there was a lot of concern over best execution. On the other
hand, it is fair to say that they were dragging their feet in endless
meetings on National Market System plans on how they were going to
link.
It took very aggressive steps by the Commission to basically say,
"Either you come up with a plan, or we will implement a plan." Again,
47. See In the Matter of the Application of the International Securities Exchange
LLC For Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No.
42,455, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,388 (Mar. 2, 2000).
48. See Options Special Study, supra note 23.
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that is what makes our authority so important. We do try to a large
extent to leave things to the marketplace. Although we consider
ourselves experienced, we think that they are in the best position to
know for the most part what will work. When push comes to shove, it
may be that we think we can put our heads together and do it ourselves.
That really is, I think, one of our recent successes that probably
hasn't gotten quite that much attention, but the linkage of the options
market is now fully operational.
The other sort of good news we got just the other day. We had
been fighting for quite some time to get a national best bid and offer
(NBBO) in the options market, which is remarkable that in 2003 we do
not have that. It is a fundamental condition of the equity markets that
you know what is the best price offered in the marketplace at any time
for a particular security. It is pretty embarrassing that it took this long,
but we were told that one of the major market vendors was starting to
offer NBBO for option products starting this week. Therefore, we have
made some progress.
The other thing that, as I said, Andy mentioned was this issue on
how could it possibly be that there are such fragmented markets this far
into the process. As you know, at our peril-and we still have the
bruises to show for it-we had the audacity to raise the issue in, God
forbid, a Concept Release about fragmentation in the marketplace, and
whether it was a problem. I personally did not know there were that
many lobbyists in the free world.
We took a tremendous amount of heat for even raising the issue,
and really I thought we had a fairly balanced Concept Release49 that
asked the question: "Is fragmentation a problem, given that we have so
many markets?" Market competition is a great thing. We have multiple
competing markets but, you know, at some point, when you have these
pockets of liquidity that aren't interacting with each other, it really, as a
market structure issue, probably doesn't lead to the best price.
We asked if there were ways that we should consider linking the
markets in a more effective way, virtually or otherwise, and had a range
of possible things to consider. It started with the very modest thought
49. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
by the New York Stock Exchange to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission Request
for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act Release No.
42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 23, 2000).
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that perhaps great transparency about execution quality in the
marketplaces might be a good thing for investors. It went all the way up
through the sixth option, which was the dreaded virtual central limit
order book.
We came out of that experience, as I said, with a lot of people using
terms like "central planning" and "socialist systems," but we did
ultimately implement what was again the most modest of the proposals.
This was the Execution Quality Disclosure Rules,50 which I think have
added transparency and discipline to the markets. We now have the
market centers reporting on a monthly basis their execution quality
statistics, stock by stock, at particular sizes.
Although I do not think it gets a lot of attention at the investor level,
I think that the broker-dealers who are routing orders are keenly aware
of the statistics. They, I believe, now, more than ever before, engage in
more rigorous review of where they are directing orders; and if they do
not, I hope they feel that they are doing that at their peril. At least there
is more discipline in their feeling that they should have obligations as an
agent to be routing orders to the market that is offering the best
execution for their customers.
The other thing that I could talk about a bit is, as you know, and as
Rick is probably most painfully aware, we do have an awful lot of
unfinished business, including National Market System business. One
of the things that we did recently-partly because, as the panelists have
indicated, it is very difficult for the Commissioners to synthesize all of
this information and to be able to some extent to tell not only who is
telling the truth and where people are acting in their own best interest,
but sometimes it is hard for them to remember from one meeting to the
next how what they are being told is inconsistent-because of that, and,
interestingly, probably coming directly out of our experience, as Rick is
painfully aware, with the intense negative lobbying that went on about
super-montage, we thought that with respect to the other major market
structure issues that it might make sense to literally get all of the
Commissioners in a room and to get all of the key market players who
had disparate views on the issues to talk about them in the same room at
the same time, so that literally, on a contemporaneous basis, we would
have one person saying something and the person with the opposite view
would immediately be able to make their point. It would give the
50. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.11Acl-5; 240.11Acl-6.
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Commissioners an opportunity to really get a better flavor and to ask
questions." I think that was really quite successful. I think that was a
very good educational process.
Having said that, we now are going to have to actually move on
and, noting the issues that were raised at the hearings, we are going to
craft basically recommendations for the Commission on further action.
It goes to a number of issues that are a problem in the marketplace
today.
Again, starting with our earlier speakers' comments, market data is
a tremendously successful tool that we use here, but under the National
Market System plans the way that market data revenues are split and the
means by which market data fees are charged is really coming into
question. I don't know if I would weigh it up there with fixed
commissions, but it is causing massive distortions in the way people are
now executing and printing transactions.
Originally, I think, the intention was that market data revenue was
going to be used for regulatory purposes. We now find that sometimes
as much as 80 percent is being rebated to market participants who direct
orders to particular markets. The way some of the formulas work
basically rewards markets for the number of trade prints, so you now
have some splitting in some circumstances between where the
transaction is quoted and where it is printed. That again is something
that was not contemplated certainly in how this works. It leads to
reporting of market data showing transactions as occurring in places
where really the orders did not interact in that venue at all. Some would
say it is misleading.
It calls into question the fairness of the market data fees because if
they are fair-and the statute requires that they be "fair and
reasonable"-why is it that 80 percent of it can be rebated? That is just
one of a number of issues that we are dealing with and that were
discussed at the hearings.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Being in New York, I think it is particularly
appropriate when reflecting on the Division's history and going forward
to think back to September 11, 2001. I was at the Commission at the
time. I think that people do not realize that this was really the major
51. See SEC Press Release 2002-148, Commission Sets Dates for Market Structure
Hearings (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-148.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
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market stoppage in U.S. history. The markets got back online so
quickly, despite the fact that there were really such close personal ties, I
think, between people on the Division staff and in the industry and
obviously people here in New York, with individuals who were lost.
Maybe you can tell us a little bit about that day and really how the
Division helped and worked with industry to get the markets going
again, and also comment on how the industry is working now perhaps to
deal with future market stoppages, perhaps by any future terrorist
events?
MS. NAZARETH: I think it is a very different world today
certainly than it was before September 1 1th. I think a lot of us who
worked over that period actually felt quite privileged to be able to work
on the reopening of the markets. I know in Market Regulation it seemed
like the whole staff really wanted to be involved. Even those who
continued to work and to shoulder the burdens of those who were
diverted to working on the market reopenings really put in a tremendous
effort.
As you know, the Commission had emergency procedures in place
certainly. I think, largely as a result of all of the preparedness for Y2K,
the Commission actually was really even that much better prepared in
terms of having emergency numbers for all of the major market players,
the markets themselves, the clearing agencies, the major firms, and other
regulators both domestically and abroad. There was a tremendous
amount of communication and coordination to determine the readiness
of the markets to reopen.
I think largely the success was also due in part to the fact that the
marketplace came together and came to a joint decision on the readiness
to reopen the equity markets the following Monday. There was a lot of
effort that went into ensuring that the systems could be up and running.
There certainly was a feeling that the worst thing that could happen
would be to attempt to come up too soon, and then have the markets go
down.
There were a lot of changes in the way we had reviewed our role at
the Commission, in terms of having our staff automation specialists and
the like who could work with the people at the markets over the
weekend in the testing phase and all. It was very helpful to us as
regulators to have some of our own people who were there side by side
with the technology people at the markets to be sure that we would be
ready to come up.
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You know, there have been a lot of lessons learned from the
experience. I know Bob has spent a great deal of time working on a lot
of the business continuity issues, if you want to talk about the White
Paper or anything like that.
In general, I think we are working with other financial regulators,
including the Fed and the OCC and the New York State Banking
Department, on a White Paper on best practices and how to strengthen
business continuity across the markets.
These are things that I don't know if some of my predecessors had
to spend a lot of time on, but it is really quite a new world. We are
having meetings with the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD on
reciprocal backup contingency plans and the like. This emphasis on
readiness, backups, and continuity, I think, is probably something that is
much more of a focus today than it was for my predecessors.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: I think that one of the interesting things
over the last several years has been the fact that - you mentioned,
Annette, the International Securities Exchange - all of a sudden there
are new entities coming into the Commission seeking to register. I
know this is an issue near and dear, I'm sure, Rick, to your heart.
Do you have any ideas for the staff in terms of how to deal with
new exchange applications?
MR. KETCHUM: Sure. The SEC should be flexible, like they have
been over the years.
I would just say one thing on what Annette said before. Again, if
you want to look at what works and does not work with respect to the
structure of expert agencies in the United States, September 11 th was a
perfect example of what worked. I think it worked both with respect to
the self-regulatory system and with respect to the SEC.
The SEC had the ability to have people involved who actually
understood the markets. They were able to act as intermediaries
between an executive branch that was understandably desirous of
making a statement for the country that markets were up and would
work, and with people who understood that the worst thing that could
happen would be for markets to go up and not work. This was not
terribly written about, but I think it was really an incredible contribution
of the SEC, and one that they can feel very proud about.
With respect to exchange definitions and registrations and the like, I
guess I will take a little bit more of a historical perspective to show that
it is not totally self-interested. I think the way that the SEC has dealt
2004]
336 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
with the definition of an exchange has been good over the years.
Actually, if you look at the things from all our times that have worked,
albeit in ways that have driven me out of my mind in my second life,
flexibility has been important. Probably the most important place that
the SEC showed flexibility was with respect to automated transaction
systems, now defined as ATSs-things that back then were not thought
of a lot but had names like Instinet.
When the SEC first started to deal with entities like Instinet,12 they
were dealing with extremely small entities with an environment in which
competition between markets, as Andy so unreasonably chose to remind
us today, had not evolved to perfection. There was not the level of limit
order display and ability for investors to directly interact in the market
that exists today.
The Commission took advantage of what is a very broad-ranging
definition of "exchange" that could have been used to just slap down any
innovation with regard to trading systems in the United States. I say
"could have" because if you look throughout the rest of the world, you
realize that the rest of the world figured out how to do exactly that. For
periods of years, only gradually unbending over time, the rest of the
world's rules basically did not permit trading systems to operate outside
of exchange registration, and often did not permit more than one
exchange to operate. The more I keep talking about this, the more I
think that would be really a good idea.
[Laughter.]
52. "In 1969, Instinet began operating a computer/communications network to be
used by professional investors to effect large block trades." Proprietary Trading
Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,406 (Apr. 11, 1989).
Instinet currently is a subsidiary of Reuters Holdings PLC, a London-based news and
financial data company. As originally operated, the Instinct system allowed
subscribers to enter offers to buy and sell securities, as well as acceptances of such
offers and counteroffers. All information was entered into the system anonymously
through code numbers. Although the Instinct customer base primarily was
institutional, Instinct made its services available to anyone who was "financially
responsible," including broker-dealers. Any security could be traded through the
system, and there were no market makers, floor brokers, or other traditional
"exchange-type" participants. Instinct continues to allow its participants to accept
"live" orders, and, in addition, has expanded its system to initiate a "crossing




But that wasn't the way the Commission went, and instead, even
though-
MR. KLEIN: It did do that, though, ten years ago. I mean, it took it
ten years to figure it out and agree with me.
MR. KETCHUM: You're right, Andy.
Instead, the Commission went down the road of taking a definition
that could pull in just about anything that broker-dealers do as far as
putting a purchaser and a seller together. Instead, they took what some
would call creative, and others would call lawless, stances in defining
things that did put things together with respect to electronic systems as
not requiring registration as an exchange. That led to, I think,
interesting levels of innovation, from things like Instinet, which
spawned the ECNs53 and automated trading systems of the day, to things
like ITG54 that provided the initial single-price auction type of
environment existing in the United States. There were also a host of
other things that did not work as well but gave lots of people something
to think about over the years.
MR. COLBY: May I just say that, in case you are not putting it
together, the process I said was really good Rick just called lawless.
MR. KETCHUM: No. That was ATS.
MR. COLBY: That's what I said.
MR. KETCHUM: ATS was sort of the next step on the way, which
was actually really good at the time-
MR. COLBY: Oh, okay. I'm sorry. Go ahead.
MR. KETCHUM: -because over time these entities grew
dramatically and became a significant part of the market structure, and
yet they were operating separately. That led to real problems-
MR. KLEIN: Which we enjoy today.
MR. KETCHUM: We enjoy it in a different way today, such as
firms executing orders for retail investors at very different prices than
they executed their own orders.
53. "Electronic Communications Networks, or ECNs, are electronic trading
systems that automatically match buy and sell orders at specified prices." See Electronic
Communications Networks (ECNs), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/ecn.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
54. ITG is a confidential electronic trading system for institutional investors. See
About ITG: The ITG Story, at http://www.itginc.com/about/itgstory.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2003).
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MR. KLEIN: You left out that part about all those OTC market
makers eating their customers' limit orders for centuries before they
finally put them into that.
MR. KETCHUM: It's got to be a short story, Andy.
MR. BECKER: None of this has anything to do with what is an
exchange. It does have everything to do with whether the SEC is going
to adopt rules or otherwise set standards for how people handle customer
orders irrespective of the legal framework in which it occurs.
MR. KLEIN: That's quite right, because the main problem now has
been-and it would have happened no matter what had happened with
the definition of an ATS as an exchange-the enormous tension between
floor-based, open-outcry systems of trading and electronic markets and
how to connect them. That is a problem with this entire-
MR. COLBY: But that goes back to eighteenth-century
scholasticism about legal form, which has only obscured the question of
the quality of the execution and the standards of the execution.
MR. KETCHUM: Okay. I am going to tie it together in three
paragraphs, because I think you guys are, as usual, both right and really
wrong.
The SEC showed flexibility in the definition of exchange when they
should. They stepped in and tightened it up-maybe not in the right
way necessarily, but at least bringing back linkages and avoiding
egregious situations of firms marking prices differently, through Reg
ATS, and that was good. That is probably, in my view, a pretty good
way to go--although I would note that they made one egregious error,
which I hope they are going to address this year. This is that they
allowed one set of broker-dealers to charge access fees while the rest of
the broker-dealers could not. That has fundamentally warped the
markets over the last three years, but that is a different conversation.
Nevertheless, I think the basic structure was a step in the right
direction. It did not discourage innovation, and I think it has led to a
competitive environment that kind of works. I will disagree with Andy
because when you have automatic execution, it actually does kind of
work.
They should do the same thing with exchange applications today.
There is something called NASDAQ that the SEC in Reg ATS said is
obviously an exchange but doesn't need to register as one because we
have the same authority. They were right then, and they should take that
action now.
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The good thing about things like the definition of National Market
System securities and the definition of exchange is you don't have to
have a single set, you can have subsets. What one would hope is that
with respect to NASDAQ, that the SEC chose to regulate them in the
way they did because they liked a competing environment. They liked
an environment that more and more provided automatic executions, and
they chose incrementally to make sure that environment did things in a
way that protected investors better. One would certainly hope they
would not decide to do it one way or another based on whether it
happened to be an exchange or not an exchange because the impact on
investors would be exactly the same either way.
I hope that the SEC will take that key and recognize that there can
be subsets of exchanges, just like everything else they have done. They
should continue to regulate the NASDAQ the way they have before and
continue to regulate other entities in other ways, where they have floors
and give people second looks and hours to decide what to do with their
orders and regulate them differently.
MR. KLEIN: Does this come under the caption of what Bob was
talking about, which is people arguing all these different things in their
economic interest?
MR. KETCHUM: No. It comes under the caption of providing
honest, independent advice.
MR. COLBY: I do think it comes close to that, Andrew, because
there is a policy issue, which has to do with whether or not the SEC
wants to require that broker-dealers executing their customers' orders
provide some sort of facility for those orders to interact with the orders
of customers of other broker-dealers and, if so, under what
circumstances.
MR. KETCHUM: That wasn't the policy issue. That was the whole
basis for where we started thirty years ago, and something that we did
away with.
Andy is still frustrated that the rest of us didn't listen to him all
those years ago.
MR. COLBY: That issue is a real issue that the Commission should
do something about. Does the Commission want to address the issue in
the context of clean crosses, or does it want to do so in the context of
over-the-counter dealers and how they interact with their customers'
orders? It has nothing to do with the formal recognition as an exchange
or not an exchange. There is a substantive policy judgment.
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It is the same way that the Commission used Reg ATS"5 to finally
get limit orders displayed. It could have amended its Quote Rule and
required the display of limit orders. Instead, it used legal form to
accomplish an objective result, and that's fine. They do that all the time,
but the clarity that is lacking is an ability to address the underlying
policy issue and then set standards across broker-dealers so that they are
held to the same standard-or at least the investors-with the same
quality of execution.
MR. KLEIN: I was going to tell the group that for the period that I
spoke of, another way of going to get a little read of what it was is go
back and look at the House Report, the "Five-Year Status Report on a
National Market System. ' 56 That really tells you all you need to know.
You will hear all of this stuff that you are hearing now, then. You
will find the House saying, "You know what the problem is here? The
Commission lacks will. They will not use the powers we gave them to
take on and resolve these problems." That was true then, and it is true
now.
In the report-the Democrats were in control of Congress then-the
Republicans wrote a nice piece at the end of this Report that says "We
think the Commission is doing just great. They should be congratulated.
They have kept their hands off this thing and they have let the industry."
All of a sudden, I think we're talking politics instead of the other stuff.
MR. COLBY: One footnote. You did make a reference to the
European markets and the rest of the world. If you go down and get
involved in this stuff, treat the rest of the world with care and suspicion.
Those markets are dominated by universal banks. Their electronic
equity markets are basically little subdivisions for these global banks
and generally owned by these global banks.
MR. KLEIN: Those are the ones that are not the envy of the world.
Are those the ones you are talking about?
MR. COLBY: Yes, those, right.
It is just not apples and oranges-well, it is apples and oranges, but
it is not a fair comparison. You will see that in the literature every now
55. See Reg ATS, supra note 38.
56. See SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the American
Enterprise Institute (May 7, 2003) (citing five-year status report on the 1975
amendments), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050703psa.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2003).
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and then someone will find some small auction electronic market in an
emerging Eastern European country. Since it does four trades a day
using a particular auction technique, they say that the New York Stock
Exchange should adopt it. Don't go there.
MR. KLEIN: You've got to admit that the IRC is impressive,
though.
MR. KETCHUM: At the risk of maybe going there for a second,
those are the very same markets that have dramatically wider spreads
than the U.S. markets. They have tried to figure out for the last five
years how to get dealers back in a marketplace that is no longer
profitable for them to operate in.
MR. PICKARD: Aren't these issues really going away? If you
look at a major broker-dealer trading operation today, you walk into the
trading room and see computers and software that are going to bring
those traders to any liquid source in this country almost instantaneously.
I've got three or four clients that have shown me these operations. If
you've got four or five ECNs, you've got several trading floors, you've
got upstairs market makers, they are all-the interconnection has already
resulted. A lot of these issues are not issues any longer from an
economic standpoint.
MR. COLBY: Some of the issues, Lee, are coded in when they try
to capture the regulatory rents. They designed the smart router to
capture the print rebates that they can get from individual markets. They
also designed the smart router to take advantage of opportunities for
internalization in individual markets.
MR. PICKARD: That's a cynical view. I mean, these mechanisms
are designed-
MR. COLBY: Is that the same as accurate?
MR. KLEIN: Harsh reality.
MR. PICKARD: Yes. They are designed really to give the best
possible execution to their institutional or retail clients. I mean, at least
that is what they purport to do. Now, maybe they are deluding
themselves, but that is what they do. You have all these software
companies and computer companies that are offering these services that
provide instantaneous access and execution to virtually any liquid
market in this country, and they are all in place.
MR. COLBY: I agree with you. I'm just saying that there are-
MR. PICKARD: Let's go home.
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MR. COLBY: -some embedded regulatory costs that the
Commission needs to address whether they should be part of that. Take
rebates-internalization opportunities come to mind. It's fine. The
routers are designed to try and capture and pass some of that stuff on-
access fees, who has them, who doesn't have them.
MR. KLEIN: How about just knowing what a price is when depth
has disappeared at any particular price point? I mean, nobody has any.
Then, when you went to decimals, all of a sudden the percentage of the
quote is 200 shares. I mean, that is an exaggeration, but the depth that is
available at the pricing points of an eighth are not there, so you don't
know what the price is anymore from moment to moment. You see
narrower spreads for smaller size and say, "Gee, we're saving you a lot
of money"--except try to go trade. You can't trade at the size that you
could with certainty.
MR. PICKARD: This is an example of the type of thing that goes
on in Market Regulation.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Actually, that may be a good transition to a
question of interest down at this end of the table for our first four
panelists, which is: given all of the experience that you have gained
since leaving the Commission, there is some interest on this side of table
as to if there might be one thing you would have done differently when
you were Director, if you knew then what you know now?
MR. PICKARD: Well, I've heard that somebody said experience is
something you learn right after you need it. So, Andy, I'll let you
respond to that question.
[Laughter.]
MR. KLEIN: The one thing I would have done if I had understood
what I was getting into is I wouldn't have accepted Harold's offer.
[Laughter.]
MR. KETCHUM: I think the best thing about the Commission is
that you always have alumni around to tell the staff, and particularly
audiences like the one here, about how miserably they're mucking it up
now, unlike "back in the good old days when everything worked
perfectly." So it would be wrong for me now to say where we screwed
up then. That's for other people.
MR. PICKARD: You know, there is one thing I can add. I was
absolutely surprised over the years with the success of the net capital
and the segregation rules and how the broker-dealer industry has really
survived the turmoil without any serious demise or investor loss. That
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program, which we were all struggling at the time trying to put together,
not knowing really where it was going to go, turned out to be almost
unassailable in its effectiveness.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: Actually, there are, I think, some regrets
down on this side of the table now, so there is a request to know what
you think was the best accomplishment of your time.
MR. PICKARD: I think inadvertently that was my best
accomplishment, because I just wasn't sure about the wisdom of it, and
it was a day-to-day struggle fine-tuning that. The application and the
workings of that program have been just remarkable. I mean, there have
not been any serious financial bankruptcies or loss where investors have
lost money since the inception of that program. There have been a few,
but not many.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: What I would like to do is stop there and go
to a tradition, which we don't have that much time for, which is to go to
the audience for one or two questions for the panel, and then conclude
and go on to enjoy the reception.
Are there any questions from the audience?
QUESTION: If you could give us some insight from where you all
sit, from history down to now, as to what the level of sophistication is.
Where are we in terms of derivatives and the need to regulate them or
not? Also, with respect to the international side, we all know, which
you've alluded to, that you can open up an office in Shanghai
somewhere and have tremendous impact on credit derivatives, equity
derivatives. These are not interest rate derivatives anymore.
I was interested in maybe getting some insight from both
practitioners and current regulators as to what is the level of discussion
going on now at the SEC as well as among the other regulatory
agencies? Are we just talking about "Well, that's your business; that's
mine?" Is it territorial?
MR. BECKER: I'll take a quick shot at two observations.
One, in my experience, the agencies work just splendidly when they
are dealing with a common objective and a common crisis, and they
work cooperatively even going forward. With 9/11, when you've got
somebody of the caliber of Peter Fisher at the Treasury and people like
Chris Cummings at the New York Fed, things are going to get done. It
is going to be done in a professional manner, with a common objective,
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and they are going to do just an outstanding job working together for the
same government with the same objectives. They are also going to do a
good job working together on business continuity planning and have
shared objectives. They will do less well working on some of the
regulatory capital issues.
Then you hit the seam, and the seam is something like derivatives,
where you implicate their respective jurisdictions. Unfortunately in my
experience, I think the turf impedes the conversation-good fences,
good neighbors. If the turf question had been resolved, they could deal
with it just as a question of professionalism. But because it does not get
resolved, it tends to get too wrapped up in the jurisdictional issues. I
agree that that is still a long-term risk for the markets.
MS. McGUIRE: Speaking from the perspective of now, I think that
we do work well together. Right now where we are on credit derivatives
is we are letting the industry sort itself out, which is a tried and true
mechanism with respect to over-the-counter derivatives.
The Group of 30 was responding to the early crises. Over time, the
industry has successfully redone documentation, reorganized itself, and
refocused, with the goal, in part, of maintaining the independence of
having market supervision.
It is really not a fully organized market yet. If it becomes a price
setter, as some of the newspaper articles have said about credit
derivatives, then I think that is what will trigger a refocus.
What the President's Working Group really decided was that none
of the current systems would be right to regulate a derivatives market. It
should not be a commodities futures exchange, and it should not be a
securities exchange. If at some point the market becomes too organized,
it may need to be regulated. It probably cannot be divided between
things that bank supervisors supervise and things that they do not. The
bank pull-off will not work if you are talking about a market.
Those are the things that I think we all knew, but we did not know
what probably we are going to solve. Warren Buffet says that he has
decided to get out of the OTC derivatives market. Well, he is already in
a lot of other businesses that have a lot of risk. Whether the risks can be
managed or not, I do not know. I am hoping the bank regulators are
looking carefully because they are interested in the safety and soundness
of their institutions.
We will look also in terms of assessing the risks of the broker-
dealers that we supervise. Right now, that is what we are doing. We are
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trying to make sure that the players that we work with are stable.
Whether we should be doing more, the whole issue goes back to the
beginning of the time of market regulation. Should you regulate the
institutional trader, should you regulate the hedge fund, should you
regulate the market participant, or can you regulate the intermediaries?
Those are really hard questions with OTC derivatives.
And so it seems that-I am not ready to grapple with them. Maybe
my boss is.
PROFESSOR ROSEN: It looks like Annette may want to take a
pass.
I think that is a great way for us to end.
I would just like to thank our panel again for a fascinating
discussion.
Thank you all for joining us this evening. We hope you will be able
to join us outside for the reception. Thank you very much.
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